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RISK AND SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS: TOWARD A UNIFIED CONCEPT
C. Ariel Pinto, Old Dominion University
Michael K. McShane, Old Dominion University
Rani Kady, Alhosn University
Abstract
The scope of this paper is the survey of both
fundamental and most recent publications in system-ofsystems, business and insurance, as well as risk
analysis, modeling, and management for the purpose of
better describing the concept of risk in recognition of
emergence and complexity which characterizes many
systems within the concern of engineering and business
managers. The ultimate goal is to provide engineering
and business managers the necessary perspective on the
concept of risk and in its management for the next
generation o f sustainable systems - including various
descriptions of risk and discussion of the relevance of
properties of system-of-systems to sustainable
management o f risks in engineered systems. The result
shows that to address a truly sustainable management
of risk, there has to be a change in paradigm from
traditional description of risk to that of a more holistic
perspective.

project management and by Dillon and Tinsley (2005)
in decision making.
More recently, there have been attempts to unify
various concept of risk, namely the works of Aven, et
al. (2004), Holton (2004), and Samson, et al. (2009).
There are also works of Letens, et al. (2008) and
Haimes (2009). Many of these works describe very
well the various commonly-held definitions of risks,
related concepts such as uncertainty and probability, as
well as approaches to unify, or at least organize these
concepts in a coherent manner. However, none of
these works addresses the variations in the definition of
risk from a truly systems perspective that capture
peculiar characteristics of complex systems. Exhibit 1
shows the usual categorization of risk based on its type,
the data from which it is deduced and the estimation
approach.
Exhibit 1. Types of risks and contextual factors
(adapted from Segal 2007)

Key Words
Risk, uncertainty, complexity, systems approach

Types o f
Risks
- Financial
- Insurance
- Operational
- Strategic
... etc.

Introduction
"Given the ubiquity o f risk in almost every human
activity, it is surprising how little consensus there is
about how to define risk. " - Damodaran (2008, p. 3)
There is indeed little consensus on the definition of
risk. However, this lack of consensus is not at all
surprising from a systems analysis perspective. This
lack of apparent consensus is in fact a property
consistent of an abstract concept such as risk in
modern-day complex and evolving society wherein
human activities are contextualized.

Data
volume
-High
-Low

Data type
- Subjective
- Objective

Estimation
approach
- Deterministic

-

Nondeterministic

Engineering managers, in their role in "planning,
organizing, allocating resources, and directing and
controlling activities which have a technological
component" (ASEM, 2010) have to deal with some
form of risk management activities. Systems engineers,
in their "interdisciplinary approach and means to
enable the realization of successful systems" (INCOSE
2004, p. 12) are also in this same predicament.
However, unlike traditional engineering practitioners,
EM's and SE's are bound to cross traditional
disciplines and will have to deal with whatever
difference there may be among these disciplines.

Risk analysis in engineering management is not
new. In 1998, Price suggested a fairly simplified risk
assessment approach composed of two major stages:
(1) determination of event sequences, and (2)
evaluation o f event frequencies and probabilities. This
approach primarily pertains to industrial settings. Other
well-discussed applications of risk assessment in
engineering management are by Componation, et al.,
(2001), and by Weiss and Anderson (2004) in
organizational effectiveness, by Carbone and Tippett
(2004), Wilhite and Lord (2006), and Parsons (2007) in

The main purpose of the following sections is to
better describe the concept of risk in recognition of
emergence and complexity which characterizes many
systems within the concern of engineering and business
managers.
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Around 1662, John Graunt applied probability to
raw data, which was previously only applied to games
of chance. Graunt gathered birth and death information
and applied sampling methods and used probabilities in
an attempted to estimate average expected ages at
death. This ushered key theoretical concepts needed for
making decisions under conditions of uncertainty,
namely sampling and averages. All these notions
would lead to the science of statistical analysis.

First foundation of risk: undesirable consequences
The notion of undesirable events and their
characteristic consequences (from hereon will be
referred to as the same) permeates human and public
psyche for centuries. Ever since humans started
recognizing the perils of sea voyage and long journeys,
and the unpredictable weather, the notion of
undesirable consequence has been part of daily lives.
During Classical Antiquity (700 BC to 500 AD),
appeasing the gods was the only form of dealing with
these consequential events. During the Middle Ages
(500AD to 1300AD), religion dominated many aspects
of life and dealing with undesirable consequences were
mostly related to ensuring a good afterlife, not this life.
However around 500 AD, the development of the
Hindu Arabic numeral system provided more suitable
calculation. Managing and not simply dealing with
undesirable consequences started to emerge as humans
started to believe they are free agents and to some
extent have self-determination.

In the immediately preceding paragraphs, one may
aptly recognize the absence of the word risk. This is an
intentional omission to emphasize that the modem day
common concept associated with this word may carry
with it extraneous meanings. As an example, risk is
nowadays often described as a function of consequence
and probability, e.g. by Kaplan (1997), among other
equally valid alternative descriptions. One then may
wonder ifthere was the concept of risk (detached to the
word itself) prior to the development of the concept of
probability. To avoid going into the path of tracing
back in history where the concept of risk originated,
the notion of undesirable consequence is used instead
without loss of generality.

During the Renaissance (1300) and Protestant
Reformation (1517), mysticism started to yield to
science and logic. As intellechmls rediscovered the
works of the classical Greek philosophers, people
started focusing on understanding how the world
works. With theory and experiments at the center of the
scientific method and more pronounced free-will, the
fuhrre became no longer totally a matter of chance or
god's will.

The immediately preceding paragraphs also make
evident the fundamental notion of undesirable
consequence, more fundamental than risk itself.
Undesirable consequence can be loosely described as
an event, whether in the past, the present, or the futme
which nominally is supposed to be avoided, and thus
the use of the term undesirable.

All this eventually leads to the rise of capitalism:
epitome of managing undesirable consequences, where
the modem methods of dealing with the unlmown start
with measurement of odds and probabilities. In 1545,
Cardano provided the foundation for calculating odds
by making the first serious effort to develop the
principles of probability, but not yet the theory of
probability as known today. Back then, the principle
merely equates probability with the number of
favorable outcomes divided by the total number of
possible outcomes. Around 1654, Pascal and Fermat
laid the fundamental groundwork of probability theory.
They solved a problem of how to divide the winnings
of an incomplete game posed two hundred years earlier
by Luca Paccioli where the game is played in rounds
tmtil one player has won enough rounds. They have
concluded that the division of winnings should not
depend on what has happened already, but on what
could happen if game had continued until finishing.
This means that for the first time, people can forecast
the future and make decisions with the help of
numbers: a big leap in dealing with future undesirable
consequences.

There is an apparent difference on how the word
risk is used in various fields of disciplines. The
difference is most evident between financial and
engineering fields, as pointed out by Potras (2006). The
most apparent difference is that "financial economics
associates risk with the possibility that the actual reh1m
for a security will differ from the expected retmn
(Poitras 2006, p. 1). Nonetheless, it has also been
established that these apparent differences in the use of
the word risk are "problem sensitive (Samson, et al.
2009 pp.4). This means that the respective use of the
word risk (and later on, uncertainty) evolved as a result
of, or possible to affect the problems from various
fields.
Consider the difference between the expected and
achml rehlm of financial securities being termed as
risk. Initially, one may deduce that here, risks pertains
to both undesirable and desirable consequences.
However, upon closer look, one would realize that in
financial securities, departure from the expected,
whether upside or downside, is undesirable. This is
more commonly expressed whenever the concept of
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volatility is used. This shows that undesirability has
more to do with the objective of the individual, the
organization, or the systems, and less with the absolute
values of the phenomenon, e.g. high or low returns of
financial securities.
As such, herein rest the first foundation of unified
concept of risk for EM's and SE's: that at the most
fundamental level, risk is about events that are
undesirable based on some notion of recognized
objective, i.e. objectives that determine desirable
events.
Second foundation of risk: uncertainty
In mathematics, randomness has particular meaning.
This is most evident in describing variables that change
every time it occurs or is observed. It was earlier
mentioned that the development of the concept of
probability paved the way to more scientific
management of undesirable consequence. This was
based on the fact that nowadays, probability is often
used to represent uncertainty.

In the common language, uncertainty implies
doubt, ambiguity, lack of knowledge, and others. It is
often useful to further describe sources of uncertainty:
aleatory and epistemic. Epistemic uncertainty refers to
uncertainty in our state of lmowledge about
phenomena. This is also known as reducible
uncertainty, pertaining to its property to be reduced
through investigation, reasoning, and other forms of
analyses. Aleatory uncertainty, on the other hand, is
due purely to the variation in outcomes of randomness.
This is also known as ineducible uncertainty,
pertaining to its property of not being reduced by
further investigation, reasoning, and other forms of
analyses. It should be pointed out that aleatory
uncertainty is predicated by the acceptance that
randomness truly exists. Uncertainty has been debated
for centuries and goes way back to 380BC as espoused
by Plato in his book, the Republic, and his cave
allegory. His belief was that we can never understand
reality empirically. That is, one cannot use our five
senses to understand reality.
Jumping forward to . the 20th century, a famous
attempt to define and distinguish between uncertainty
and risk is by Knight (1921) where uncertainty comes
in two types: measurable and unmeasurable. With
measurable uncertainty, one can come up with a
probability to quantify the uncertainty. On the other
hand, one cannot even do that for unmeasurable
uncertainty. Unmeasurable uncertainty was simply
referred to as "uncertainty" while measurable
uncertainty was referred to as "risk". So in Knight's
perspective, risk is a subset of uncertainty. This was an

interesting attempt to distinguish between risk and
uncertainty, but it had some peculiarities. For one, it
didn't relate the "consequence of the outcome". For
example, Knight would have considered the roll of dice
to be a risk such that one can quantify the probability
of the outcome, but will still consider it a risk even if
there is no betting involved.
There is also an apparent difference on the use of
the word risk in relation to uncertainty, as discussed by
Samson, et al. (2009). They essentially described two
ways risk and uncertainty are associated, 1) that these
two pertains to the same or different concept, and 2)
which one depends on the other, as shown in Exhibit 2
Exhibit 2. Conceptual relationships of risk and
uncertainty (Adapted from Samson, et al. 2009, p. 2)
Uncertainty and Risk
I

I

I

Uncertainty= Risk

Uncertainty f. Risk
I
I

I

Independent

Dependent

I
I

I

Risk depends on
uncertainty

Uncertainty depends
on risk

Uncertainty and risk are undoubtedly closely
related concepts that both practitioners and academics
have struggled to define and distinguish. In fact,
Holton (2004) describes an effort by the Society for
Risk Analysis to define "risk". After four years the
Society gave up and concluded that it might be best not
to define risk, which inspired Holton to conclude that
half of the problems results from people using same
words with different meanings, and the other half
results from using different words with the same
meaning. For completeness, this society currently
defines risk as the "potential for realization of
unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health,
property, or the environment" SRA (2010).
Refening again to Exhibit 2, current practices in
SE's and EM's espouse more the notion that risk is not
equal but has a dependency relationship with
uncertainty. Exactly which one causes the other is
beyond the coverage of this paper. Nonetheless, the
complex cause-and-effect nature of the problem

domain by which SE's and EM's lend themselves more
towards the notion that risk is caused by uncertainty.

alternatives to future decisions, he or she is bound to
consider the temporal dimension of the entire risk
analysis and management activity.

As such, herein rest the second foundation of
unified concept of risk for EM's and SE's: that at the
least, there is some causal relationship between
uncertainty and undesirable events. This bears most
meaning in the context of choosing among alternatives,
each having its own uncertainty of undesirable results
(e.g. decision making scenario).

However, the temporal domain of looking at risk is
also the reflection of other properties of system of
systems, namely tight coupling among its constituent
systems, and the mere lack of complete understanding
of its entirety. Tight coupling implies that what occurs
in one constituent directly affects what happens m
another; that they are dependent on each other.

Third foundation of risk: Temporal domain
Hofstetter, et al. (2002) succinctly analogized the
temporal domain in risk analysis by likening risks to
the ripples produced by a pebble dropping on a pond.
In this analogy, the various types of risks were
described as: Target risk - the risk scenario which
prompts the whole decision process, often reflected by
the main objective; and countervailing risk - the risk
that arises from the action of managing the target risk.
The notion of countervailing risk clearly emphasizes
that risks and any present decision to take or not take
action may have an effect in the future. In particular,
other risks may arise as a result.

But possibly the most insightful generalization of
the apparent lack of consensus on risk was that of
Hatfield and Rippel (2002) when they concluded that
risk analysis is predicated to an earlier systems
identification. This essentially implies that systems
analysis is a critical and precursory task in risk
analysis. This generalization implies the importance of
recognizing system objectives prior to describing risk,
i.e. the need to first describe what are desirables before
describing what are undesirables. More recently, this
same implication has been made in a much narrower
context of anti-goals in software development (van
Lamsweerde, Axel, 2009) and in the transference of
risk in project integration (Alali and Pinto, 2009).

The realization that current problem scenarios in
which EM's and SE's work with cannot be aptly
described by traditional systems notions has been
presented by Keating, et al. (2003, 2008), and Pinto, et
al. (2006), They have explicitly and implicitly
described the complexity and emergent behavior of
modem types of systems, e.g. system of systems,
enterprise systems, federation of systems. Of particular
interests is how the emergent behavior, which cannot
be known ahead of time no matter how good the
analysis is, is a way that compounds uncertainty.
Haimes (2008) emphasized the importance of
recognizing the temporal perspective in characterizing
the state space of a system. Possibly the most held
framework in engineering risk analysis is that first
presented by Kaplan (1997) and later extended by
Haimes (2002) into six guiding questions:

As such, herein rest the third foundation of unified
concept of risk for EM's and SE's: undesirable
consequences are time-sensitive. That is the current
declaration of what may be undesirable is a mere snapshot of an ever-evolving scenario.
Conclusion
The concept of risk is strongly hinged on the concept
of undesirable events and consequences. The apparent
differences in use of the word risk can often be traced
back to the fact that what may be desirable from one
person, organization, or systems may be undesirable to
another. With the financial risk as an example, it is
important to emphasize that undesirability has more to
do with the recognized objective rather than an
absolute value of the event (e.g. volatility in the price
versus low or high price of financial securities). Exhibit
3 uses as an analogy the set of points inside the
rectangle as all possible events. In Exhibit 3a, the
points inside the ovals designate events which are
recognized to be objectives of particular systems, i.e.
the desirable events can now be differentiated from the
undesirable events. The importance of recognizing
objectives and their intersection or lack thereof is
precursor to any form of risk analysis, assessment or
management. Nowadays, EM's and SE's are most
frequently relied on do such recognition as part of the
systems identification activity.

What can go wrong?
What are the consequences?
What is the chance of occurrence?
What can be done to manage them?
What are the alternatives?
What are the effects to future decisions?
More recently, Haimes (2008) and Haimes (2009)
emphasized the importance of temporal domain when
looking at risks from a systems perspective. In a great
degree, this has already been implied with the last of
the six guiding questions. That is, every time an analyst
tries to describe the effects of risk management
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Exhibit 3. The relationship between system objectives
and undesirable events and consequences.

property consistent of an abstract concept such as risk
in modem-day complex and evolving society wherein
human activities are contextualized. The article shows
that to address a truly sustainable management of risk,
there has to be a change in paradigm from traditional
description of risk to that of a more holistic perspective
based on the more fundamental concepts of undesirable
events, uncertainty, and temporal domain.

(a)

System2
objective

System 1
objective
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